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TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION IN THE GROWING
CREDIT CARD QUAGMIRE
Clay Calvert,* Rich Shumate,** Stephanie A. McNeff,***
Stephenson Waters****
This article examines First Amendment speech concerns and related
issues of statutory construction raised by anti-surcharge statutes that prohibit merchants from imposing “surcharges” on credit card purchases, but
allow them to offer “discounts” to cash-paying customers. The article uses
the split of authority created by the November 2015 opinion of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Dana’s Railroad Supply v.
Florida and the September 2015 decision by the Second Circuit in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman as a timely springboard for analyzing
these issues. In September 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear
Expressions Hair Design and oral argument occurred in January 2017.
These cases not only test the fundamental dichotomy in First Amendment
jurisprudence between speech and conduct, but also the extent to which
courts should provide narrowing constructions to rescue otherwise unconstitutional statutes. Furthermore, the article argues that no-surcharge laws
detrimentally affect not only the right of merchants to speak, but also the
unenumerated First Amendment right of consumers to receive speech directly affecting their pocketbooks. Finally, the article concludes that nosurcharge laws smack of the worst kind of governmental paternalism—a
protection of credit card companies’ corporate interests at the expense of
consumers.
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2015, a divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Dana’s Railroad Supply v.
Florida 1 struck down on First Amendment2 grounds a Florida
1. 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.
2016).
2. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated
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statute3 that bans merchants from imposing “a surcharge”4 for credit
card purchases but that allows them to offer “a discount”5 for cash
payments. The critical threshold question in the case was whether the
statute regulated First Amendment-protected speech or merely economic conduct not subject to free-speech concerns.6 The two-judge
majority concluded that the statute restricts speech7 because it “has the
sole effect of banning merchants from uttering the word surcharge.”8
The majority then declared the law unconstitutional9 under the commercial speech doctrine as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York.10
Chief Judge Carnes dissented.11 He objected to the majority’s interpretation of “surcharge” as used in the Florida law, dubbing it a
“statute-killing definition.”12 Chief Judge Carnes called for a much
narrower, “statute-saving definition”13 of surcharge—one not raising
First Amendment speech concerns.14 In January 2016, the Eleventh
Circuit denied a petition for a rehearing en banc,15 thus leaving the
November 2015 ruling intact.
In September 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit considered a very similar New York statute and issued an
opinion diametrically opposed to that of the Eleventh Circuit majority
more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (2015).
4. See id. (emphasis added) (“A seller or lessor in a sales or lease transaction may
not impose a surcharge on the buyer or lessee for electing to use a credit card in lieu
of payment by cash, check, or similar means, if the seller or lessor accepts payment by
credit card.”).
5. See id. (emphasis added) (providing that the statute “does not apply to the offering of a discount for the purpose of inducing payment by cash, check, or other means
not involving the use of a credit card, if the discount is offered to all prospective
customers”).
6. See Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1241 (“The fate of Florida’s no-surcharge
law hinges on a single determination: whether the law regulates speech—triggering
First Amendment scrutiny—or whether it regulates conduct—subject only to rationalbasis review as a mine-run economic regulation.”).
7. Id. at 1246.
8. Id. at 1251.
9. Id. at 1249–51.
10. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
11. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1251 (Carnes, C.J., dissenting).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 1257 (writing that neither the Florida statute in question nor a similar
New York law “implicates the First Amendment”).
15. 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016).
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in Dana’s Railroad Supply.16 In Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,17 the Second Circuit considered the validity of a state statute
providing that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a
surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.”18
A unanimous three-judge panel held that the New York statute
“does not regulate speech as applied to single-sticker-price sellers”19
and, in turn, the Second Circuit had no need to “reach the parties’
arguments under Central Hudson.”20 The statute was merely a pricecontrol law that “does not implicate the First Amendment.”21 Writing
for the appellate court, Judge Livingston reasoned that the New York
statute only affects:
[T]he difference between a seller’s sticker price and the ultimate
price that it charges to credit-card customers. A seller imposing a
surcharge (an additional amount above its sticker price) on creditcard customers could choose to “characterize” that additional
charge as whatever it wants, but that would not change the fact that
it would be violating Section 518.22

The Second Circuit’s decision vacated a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the statute that U.S. District Judge Rakoff had
issued in 2013.23 Judge Rakoff had concluded that the New York statute’s “virtually incomprehensible distinction between what a vendor
can and cannot tell its customers offends the First Amendment and
renders section 518 unconstitutional.”24
The bottom line from Dana’s Railroad Supply and Expressions
Hair Design is profound confusion and a split of authority among two
federal circuits regarding whether speech and, in turn, the First
Amendment, must be considered in testing the constitutionality of
anti-surcharge statutes. As Chief Judge Carnes wrote in his dissent in
Dana’s Railroad Supply, “the majority places our circuit in direct conflict with our sister circuit on this issue.”25 This state of judicial disor16. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
17. Id.
18. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (Consol. 2015).
19. Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 130.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 131.
22. Id. at 132.
23. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), vacated, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
24. Id. at 436.
25. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Florida, 807 F.3d 1235, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (Carnes,
C.J., dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016).
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der, which the U.S. Supreme Court may resolve in 2017 after it
granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in Expressions Hair Design
in September 2016,26 is troubling for multiple reasons.
First, credit card companies—those with a vested interest in the
outcome of prohibiting surcharges—historically had contractually
banned “any attempt to differentiate between credit and cash
purchases.”27 In 2013, however, “a nationwide settlement agreement
with the credit card companies resulted in the removal of these contractual provisions.”28 Specifically, U.S. District Judge Gleeson that
year approved a class-action antitrust settlement involving credit card
giants Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard International that permits
merchants to surcharge credit card purchases and empowers them “to
expose hidden bank fees to their customers, educate them about those
fees, and use that information to influence their customers’ choices of
payment methods.”29 In brief, anti-surcharge statutes that forbid discussion of surcharges are troubling because they may constitute endruns around the settlement.
Second, the issue affects more than just Florida and New York.
At least nine states today have anti-surcharge statutes that forbid
surcharges in some manner.30 California’s anti-surcharge statute provides that:
No retailer in any sales, service, or lease transaction with a consumer may impose a surcharge on a cardholder who elects to use a
credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means. A
retailer may, however, offer discounts for the purpose of inducing
payment by cash, check, or other means not involving the use of a
credit card, provided that the discount is offered to all prospective
buyers.31
26. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). During oral argument in January 2017, “[t]he justices’
view of the case seemed to turn on where they stood in a rolling debate at the court
[sic] about how the First Amendment applies to laws regulating economic matters, an
issue that generally divides the justices along ideological lines.” Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Considers Free Speech and Credit Card Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2017, at B3.
27. Italian Colors Restaurant v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1203 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
28. Id. at 1205.
29. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F.
Supp. 2d 207, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
30. The nine states are: CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1 (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT.
5-2-212 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-133ff (2015); FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (2015);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-403 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140D, § 28A (2015);
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (Consol. 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 2-211 (2015);
TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001 (West 2015).
31. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1748.1 (emphasis added).
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In March 2015, U.S. District Judge England declared California’s law
an unconstitutional restriction of merchants’ First Amendment freedom of speech.32 As Judge England wrote, California’s statute “cannot
pass the intermediate scrutiny required for a content-based, speakerspecific restriction on consumer speech. The Court must therefore
strike down the statute as an unconstitutional restriction on First
Amendment rights.”33
In direct contrast to Judge England’s decision, however, U.S.
District Judge Yeakel upheld the constitutionality of Texas’s antisurcharge statute in February 2015—a decision later affirmed by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in March 2016 in Rowell v.
Pettijohn.34 Judge Yeakel reasoned “that the Texas Anti-Surcharge
law regulates only prices charged, an economic activity that is within
the state’s police power, and does not implicate First Amendment
speech rights.”35
Anti-surcharge statutes affect residents in the nation’s four most
populous states—California, Texas, Florida, and New York.36 Yet in
2015 alone, the statutes in Texas and New York were upheld by federal courts, while the laws in California and Florida were struck down.
This clearly is a facet of First Amendment jurisprudence that became
thoroughly muddled in 2015, and the Fifth Circuit’s affirmation in
March 2016 of the Texas statute’s constitutionality only compounds
the problem.
Third, the split of authority at the federal circuit level illustrates
that the distinction between speech and conduct—a fundamental dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence—is not always clear to
jurists.37 The Eleventh Circuit, as noted above, found that Florida’s
32. Italian Colors, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1203.
33. Id. at 1210.
34. Rowell v. Pettijohn, No. A-14-CA-190-LY, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40739
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2015), aff’d, 816 F.3d 73 (5th Cir. 2016).
35. Id. at *8–9.
36. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Florida Passes New York to Become
Nation’s Third Most Populous State, Census Bureau Reports (Dec. 23, 2014), https://
www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html (“By adding an average of 803 new residents each day between July 1, 2013 and July 1, 2014, Florida
passed New York to become the nation’s third most populous state, according to U.S.
Census Bureau state population estimates . . . . California remained the nation’s most
populous state in 2014, with 38.8 million residents, followed by Texas, at 27.0
million”).
37. See Martin H. Redish, Fear, Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic
Skepticism and the Theory of Free Expression, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 691, 700 (2015)
(discussing “the fundamental distinction between speech and conduct”); Edward J.
Eberle, The Architecture of First Amendment Free Speech, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV.
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statute involved speech,38 while the Second Circuit held that a similar
New York statute did not affect expression.39 Although conduct certainly may rise to the level of speech in some instances under the
symbolic speech doctrine,40 such symbolism was not at issue in either
Dana’s Railroad Supply or Expressions Hair Design.
Fourth and finally, the questions raised in these cases affect not
only the right to speak, but also the unenumerated First Amendment
right to receive speech.41 Specifically, merchants seek to speak freely
with customers about credit-card surcharges, while customers have a
right to receive such information directly affecting how their money is
spent. Data suggest that consumers are affected by language differences in laws such as those at issue in Dana’s Railroad Supply and
Expressions Hair Design. Professor Derek Bambauer, for example,
points out that:
[W]hen considering the relative costs of two forms of payment,
consumers readily accept a “discount for cash” but are offended by
a “surcharge for credit card use.” The critical difference is selecting
either the higher or lower price as the anchor for evaluation, particularly since consumers value avoiding losses more than potential
gains. Thus, commercial entities can influence our behavior as consumers by framing how we perceive their actions.42
1191, 1216–20 (2011) (analyzing the speech-conduct dichotomy in First Amendment
jurisprudence).
38. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit in Rowell
followed the Second Circuit’s lead in holding that Texas’ anti-surcharge law regulates
only economic activity and not expression. 816 F.3d at 82. Because the majority opinion in Rowell largely tracks the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Expressions Hair
Design, this article focuses on Expressions Hair Design—rather than Rowell—as an
exemplar of an economic-activity, non-speech conclusion.
40. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 n.2 (2003) (“[I]t is equally true that
the First Amendment protects symbolic conduct as well as pure speech.”); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (observing that symbolic speech requires
“an intent to convey a particularized message” on the part of the actor and a great
likelihood, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct, “that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it”).
41. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (emphasis
added) (“[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment,
contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and
press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right
to receive, [and] the right to read.”); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (asserting that the First Amendment “freedom
embraces the right to distribute literature and necessarily protects the right to receive
it”).
42. Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and
the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 684 (2006).
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This article thus addresses the First Amendment free speech concerns and related issues of statutory construction raised by the antisurcharge statutes, concentrating on the contrasting 2015 decisions in
Dana’s Railroad Supply and Expressions Hair Design. Part I provides
an overview of the history, policies, and goals behind the implementation of the statutes, as well as examples of statutes from the four states
whose laws were challenged in federal court in 2015: California, Florida, New York, and Texas.43 Additionally, Part I briefly explores psychological research regarding consumer perception of terms such as
surcharge and discount.44
Part II then introduces three key concepts directly at issue in the
quartet of 2015 cases challenging the constitutionality of such statutes,
namely: 1) the traditional First Amendment dichotomy between
speech and conduct; 2) the unenumerated right to receive expression,
as well as the right to speak; and 3) the metes and bounds of statutory
construction and, specifically, how far courts should go when they
attempt to provide a narrowing interpretation of a statute to save it
from judicial demise.45 Part III analyzes both Dana’s Railroad Supply
and Expressions Hair Design in greater depth and focuses on the trio
of concepts addressed in Part II.46 Finally, Part IV concludes by arguing that anti-surcharge statutes go well beyond merely affecting economic conduct to directly impacting First Amendment speech
interests.47 Part IV also asserts that these laws inappropriately cabin
individual decision-making and should be struck down by the Supreme Court when it rules in 2017 in Expressions Hair Design.
I.
PAYING WITH CASH OR CREDIT CARD? AN OVERVIEW OF
ANTI-SURCHARGE STATUTES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
FRAMING PRICES

ON

This part of the article has two sections, the first of which addresses the history and policy behind the anti-surcharge statutes at issue in cases such as Dana’s Railroad Supply and Expressions Hair
Design. The second section then reviews literature from the field of
psychology that demonstrates how framing prices in terms of either
discounts or surcharges does, in fact, affect consumer choices.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

48–84 and accompanying text.
85-108 and accompanying text.
109–210 and accompanying text.
211–293 and accompanying text.
294–312 and accompanying text.
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A. History, Terms and Policies of Anti-Surcharge Statutes
When merchants accept a customer’s credit card, they are contractually obligated to pay a percentage of the transaction total—a
swipe fee—to the credit card company (e.g., Visa, MasterCard, or
American Express).48 Part of this fee is then passed on to the company
that processes the transaction and to the card-issuing bank.49 Thus, the
profit merchants collect on a credit card transaction is less than on a
cash sale of the same amount.
According to the Merchants Payments Coalition, an advocacy
group for merchants, fees in the United States generally range from
two to four percent of the transaction total and are the highest in the
world—seven times what European merchants pay.50 Merchants cannot negotiate these fees; if they want to accept a particular brand of
credit card, they must pay the fee that the credit card issuer sets.51
Critics of swipe fees complain they amount to a hidden tax on consumers, who often are blissfully ignorant of the fact that merchants
incur higher costs by accepting credit cards.52 Merchants only have
three ways to recoup the fees. They can raise sticker prices to make up
the difference; pass on some or all of the swipe fee directly to their
customers via a surcharge for credit card purchases; or offer an incentive, such as a discount, to encourage customers to pay with cash.
Prior to 1974, the second and third options—imposing a
surcharge on credit card purchases and offering a discount for cash
customers—were forbidden by rules imposed on merchants by the
credit card companies.53 Then, in 1974, the federal Truth in Lending
Act54 was amended to provide that “a card issuer may not, by contract,
or otherwise, prohibit any such seller from offering a discount to a
cardholder to induce the cardholder to pay by cash, check, or similar
48. Joseph L. Mulvey, An Overview of Recent Developments in Merchants’ Ability
to Surcharge Credit Cards, RUBIN-LEVIN (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.rubinlevin.com/news/index.cfm?view=detail&item=390.
49. Id.
50. Reforming Credit Card Swipe Fees to Grow Our Economy, MERCHANTS PAYMENTS COALITION (Aug. 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20160316092642/http://
21353cb4da875d727a1d-ccea4d4b51151ba804c4b0295d8d06a4.r8.cf1.rackcdn.com/
Reforming_Credit_Card_Swipe_Fees_To_Grow_Our_Economy_2015.pdf.
51. Id.
52. See Complaint at 13, Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Bondi, No. 1:14-cv-00025 (N.D.
Fla. 2014) (“[C]onsumers are unaware of how much they pay for credit and have no
incentive to reduce their credit-card use because they will pay the same price
regardless.”).
53. Id. at 14.
54. This federal statute was passed in 1968 to require consistent disclosure of rules
and regulations regarding consumer credit and interest. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1968).
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means rather than use a credit card.”55 The question, then, became
whether the word “discount,” as used in the statute, allowed only discounts for cash purchases or allowed merchants to impose surcharges
on credit card purchases. In 1976, after lobbying by the credit card
industry, Congress enacted an explicit, albeit temporary, ban on
surcharges.56 Under this measure, credit card fees had to be absorbed
into the cost of the item or service being sold, and a discount was
explicitly defined as a “reduction made from the regular price.”57
After significant wrangling in Congress between the credit card
industry and consumer groups, the federal ban on surcharges expired
in 1984.58 This freed merchants to impose surcharges for credit card
prices, provided the merchant informed customers of the surcharges
prior to purchase.59
Credit card lobbyists fought hard to extend the ban, arguing that
surcharges make their product less popular; consumer groups countered that the swipe fees paid by merchants were being subsidized by
consumers, leading to increased costs for everyone.60 Railing against
efforts to extend the prohibition on surcharges, Senator William
Proxmire of Wisconsin proclaimed that “[n]ot one single consumer
group supports the proposal to continue the ban on surcharges. The
nation’s giant credit card companies want to perpetuate the myth that
credit is free.”61
Unable to persuade Congress, credit card companies began turning to state lawmakers in their quest to ban credit card surcharges.
Thus, soon after the expiration of the federal ban on two-tier pricing
systems, states began enacting their own laws to outlaw or restrict
credit card surcharges.
As noted earlier, nine states currently have anti-surcharge statutes
that forbid or restrict surcharges in some manner.62 These statutes took
on new importance after a federal 2013 antitrust settlement with Visa
U.S.A. and MasterCard International removed the last vestiges of con55. 15 U.S.C. § 1666f(a) (1974).
56. Act of Feb. 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 197.
57. Id.
58. D. Edwin Schmelzer, Truth in Lending Developments in 1985, 41 BUS. LAW.
1057, 1058 (1986).
59. Id.
60. Stephen Engleberg, Credit Card Surcharge Ban Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29,
1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/27/business/credit-card-surcharge-ban-en
ds.html.
61. Irvin Molotsky, Extension of Credit Surcharge Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29,
1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/29/business/extension-of-credit-surcharge-ba
n.html.
62. See supra note 30 (identifying the nine states).
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tractual restraints that kept merchants from imposing surcharges,63
leaving state anti-surcharge laws as the last line of defense for the
credit card companies. Attorney General Eric Holder blasted the credit
card companies’ practices in 2010 when the settlement was first proposed, asserting that they “put merchants and consumers in a no-win
situation: accept our card, pay our fees and don’t even think about
trying to get a discount.”64
The four most populous states with the largest gross domestic
products—California, Texas, New York, and Florida—all have antisurcharge statutes65 that have been challenged in court. The next subsections briefly describe the history of the statutes in those four states.
1. The Florida Statute
Florida passed its anti-surcharge statute in 1987, amid complaints
that hoteliers were slapping surcharges on unsuspecting guests who
were not warned upon checking in that the fees would be imposed.66
The measure was touted as protecting consumers, but most consumer
advocacy groups opposed anti-surcharge statutes.67 One group that
lobbied for the measure, Consumers Against Penalty Surcharges, was
actually created and paid for by the credit card industry.68
The Florida statute, which makes it a misdemeanor to impose a
surcharge, reads in key part:
A seller . . . in a sales . . . transaction may not impose a surcharge
on the buyer . . . for electing to use a credit card in lieu of payment
by cash, check, or similar means, if the seller . . . accepts payment
by credit card. A surcharge is any additional amount imposed at the
63. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the settlement).
64. Andrew Martin, Visa and MasterCard Settle Antitrust Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2010, at B1.
65. Gross domestic product (GDP) by state (millions of current dollars), U.S.
DEP’T OF COM. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/drilldown.
cfm?reqid=70&stepnum=11&AreaTypeKeyGdp=5&GeoFipsGdp=XX&ClassKeyGd
p=NAICS&ComponentKey=200&IndustryKey=1&YearGdp=2015Q2&YearGdpBe
gin=-1&YearGdpEnd=1&UnitOfMeasureKeyGdp=Levels&RankKeyGdp=1&Drill=
1&nRange=5 (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
66. Resolution Urges Buffer for Oil Drilling, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 5, 1987,
at 8B.
67. See Complaint at 20, Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Bondi, No. 1:14-cv-00025 (N.D.
Fla. 2014) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of the real consumer groups—including
Consumers Union and Consumer Federation of America—opposed state no-surcharge
laws because they discouraged merchants from making the costs of credit transparent,
which resulted in an enormous hidden tax paid by all consumers whenever they made
a purchase.”).
68. Id.
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time of a sale or lease transaction that increases the charge to the
buyer . . . for the privilege of using a credit card payment.69

It should be noted that Florida’s law does not totally ban credit
card surcharges; rather, merchants are free to impose surcharges as
long as they post both the cash and credit prices on their products to
make consumers aware of the difference prior to making a purchasing
decision.70
2. The New York Statute
Following the expiration of the federal ban on credit card
surcharges, New York enacted one of the first anti-surcharge statutes
in 1984,71 after lobbying from the credit card industry.72 The statute,
which makes imposing a surcharge a misdemeanor, reads in part:
No seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a
holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash,
check, or similar means. Any seller who violates the provisions of
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
not to exceed five hundred dollars or a term of imprisonment up to
one year, or both.73

Enforcement of the New York law, however, has been exceedingly rare.74 That is largely because until the antitrust settlement was
reached in 2013, credit issuers’ contracts with merchants already prohibited surcharges.75
Only one prosecution has been reported, that of Bronx gas station
owner Eugene Fulvio, who was arrested in 1986 after a customer complained about the station’s dual pricing—Fulvio was charging five
cents more per gallon for credit card users—and refused to pay.76 At
trial, Fulvio was acquitted of criminal mischief but found guilty of
violating the anti-surcharge law.77 However, a court later dismissed
the charge, ruling that the law created a distinction without a differ69. FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (2015) (emphasis added).
70. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Florida, 807 F.3d 1235, 1252 (11th Cir. 2015) (Carnes,
C.J., dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016).
71. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (Consol. 2015).
72. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), vacated, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016)
(noting that the statute “is the product of a decades-long battle between credit card
companies on the one hand and retailers and consumer advocates on the other”).
73. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518.
74. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 125, cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
75. Id.
76. New York v. Fulvio, 517 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009–10 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987).
77. Id. at 1009.
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ence between the terms “discount” and “surcharge” and that it impermissibly restricted speech.78
3. The Texas Statute
Texas also adopted a civil anti-surcharge statute in 1985, one
year after the federal ban on dual-pricing expired.79 The law allows
merchants to implement discounts for using cash, but it forbids any
surcharges for credit card use.80 Unlike Florida and New York, Texas
does not impose a criminal penalty for violators; rather, infractions are
handled as administrative actions by the State Consumer Credit Commissioner, and violators cannot be sued for damages.81
4. The California Statute
The California statute took effect in 1986.82 As explained by its
terms, the law is intended to:
[P]romote the effective operation of the free market and protect
consumers from deceptive price increases for goods and services by
prohibiting credit card surcharges and encouraging the availability
of discounts by those retailers who wish to offer a lower price for
goods and services purchased by some form of payment other than
credit card.83
78. Id. at 1015.
79. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001 (West 2015).
80. The full text of the law provides that:
(a) In a sale of goods or services, a seller may not impose a surcharge on
a buyer who uses a credit card for an extension of credit instead of cash, a
check, or a similar means of payment.
(b) This section does not apply to:
(1) a state agency, county, local governmental entity, or other governmental entity that accepts a credit card for the payment of fees,
taxes, or other charges; or
(2) a private school that accepts a credit card for the payment of fees
or other charges, as provided by Section 111.002, Business & Commerce Code.
(c) The consumer credit commissioner has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce this section.
(d) The Finance Commission of Texas may adopt rules relating to this
section. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall be consistent with
federal laws and regulations governing credit card transactions described
by this section.
(e) This section does not create a cause of action against an individual for
violation of this section.
Id.
81. Id.
82. Jimmy Thornton, Law Bans Credit Surcharges, Not Cash Discounts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 31, 1985, at E2.
83. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1 (West 2015).
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Unlike in Florida and New York, California’s law does not impose a
criminal penalty. Instead, consumers subjected to surcharges can go to
court to collect three times their actual damages—treble damages—
plus attorney’s fees.84
B. A Primer on Psychological Evidence of Framing Prices
The split of authority described in the introduction of this article
was likely one key reason why the U.S. Supreme Court in September
2016 granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in Expressions Hair
Design.85 Specifically, the Court granted certiorari on the question of
whether “state no-surcharge laws unconstitutionally restrict speech
conveying price information (as the Eleventh Circuit has held), or do
they regulate economic conduct (as the Second and Fifth Circuits have
held)?”86
One facet of this issue that the Court may address is whether use
of the words “surcharge” and “discount” provoke different psychological responses in consumers that benefit credit card companies and
disadvantage merchants and consumers, thereby buttressing the assertion that these laws are, at their core, an effort to regulate speech
rather than conduct.
In exploring the psychological effects anti-surcharge laws have
on consumers, it is first useful to understand how these laws actually
work. When a customer brings a product costing $100 to the cash
register and pays with a credit card, a merchant cannot impose a
surcharge (for example, $2) on the final price to make up for what is
being transferred to the credit card company.87 However, the merchant
is legally allowed to offer a discounted price (for example, $98) to
encourage the customer to use cash, as long as all customers are afforded the same discount.88 If the cash discount equals the swipe fee,
the merchant comes out even—but only for those customers who opt
to forgo using a credit card in order to get the discount.
In order to recoup fees from customers not sufficiently persuaded
by a discount, merchants would need to price the product at $102 and
offer a discount at the register. This would have the same net effect on
84. Id.
85. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
86. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d 118 (No.
15-1391), 2016 WL 3383878.
87. See Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Dana’s
R.R. Supply v. Bondi, No. 4:14-cv-00134 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (explaining how the laws
work).
88. Id.
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customers ($102 for a credit card purchase and $100 for a cash
purchase) as would the explicit surcharge. In this last scenario,
merchants have hiked prices for everyone, yet they cannot describe
those higher prices as a “surcharge” without violating state law.89
In Florida, where surcharges are banned only at the “point of
sale,”90 merchants can legally post both a cash price ($100) and a
credit price ($102) on every product, making consumers aware of the
difference before they get to the cash register. This, too, has the same
net effect on consumers as a surcharge imposed at checkout ($102 for
credit, $100 for cash), while imposing on merchants the additional
burden of affixing two different prices to everything in the store.
While there is no practical difference between a discount and a
surcharge in terms of how much consumers actually end up paying,
people behave differently when offered a discount as opposed to being
faced with the unhappy prospect of surcharge.
In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky developed prospect theory, which hypothesizes that people make decisions based on
the potential for losses or gains rather than on the actual outcome.91
Furthermore, people often evaluate the potential losses or gains differently depending on how a question is framed.92 The framing hypothesis suggests that human decision-making is affected by the way an
issue is formulated or presented to a person.93
In Tversky and Kahneman’s 1981 study, participants were given
a scenario in which they had to choose treatments for 600 people affected by a deadly disease, framed between positive and negative
choices.94 When a treatment was described as saving 200 lives, seventy-two percent of the participants chose it, even though it failed to
save 400 people.95 But when participants were told that the same treatment would not save 400 of the 600 people, only twenty-two percent
selected it, even though the same 200 lives were saved.96 This phenomenon is easily explained by prospect and framing theories. In
Kahneman and Tversky’s experiment, people who heard the positively
89. Id.
90. FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (2015).
91. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 42 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263–91 (1979).
92. Id. at 287.
93. Edmund W. Kitch, Framing Hypothesis: Is It Supported by Credit Card Issuer
Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 217, 218 n.2 (1990).
94. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981).
95. Id. at 453.
96. Id.
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framed outcome were likely to perceive the gains from the treatment,
whereas people who heard the negatively framed outcome saw the
losses from the treatment—despite the fact that the outcomes were
exactly the same.97
Examples of the framing hypothesis and prospect theory appear
across a variety of disciplines.98 In the legal field, University of Pennsylvania Professor Stephanos Bibas suggests defendants’ likelihood of
taking a plea deal depends on whether they were either detained or
remained free prior to trial. Bibas suggests that defendants in pretrial
detention are more likely to accept a plea deal because it signifies a
gain—namely, freedom—whereas defendants who are free prior to
trial view a plea deal as a loss because they would be losing their
freedom.99
The framing hypothesis and prospect theory have also been implemented in the health field. Professor Pragya Mathur and her colleagues studied the effects of framing health messages aimed at
disease prevention and detection.100 Other studies have found framing
effects on detection behaviors such as breast self-exams,101 HIV testing,102 and gum disease.103 Another study found that individual characteristics play a role in how a person reacts to a frame,104 specifically
how a person views a message promoting flossing.105 Avoidance-oriented people are more likely to floss after being given a loss-framed
message, and approach-oriented people reported flossing more after
viewing a gain-framed message.106
97. Id.
98. See Pragya Mathur et al., The Influence of Implicit Theories and Message
Frame on the Persuasiveness of Disease Prevention and Detection Advocacies, 122
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 141 (2013); Stephanos
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2004);
Alexander J. Rothman et al., The Systematic Influence of Gain-and-Loss-Framed
Messages on Interest in and Use of Different Types of Health Behavior, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1355, 1355 (1999); Seth Kalichman & Brenda Coley,
Context Framing to Enhance HIV-Antibody-Testing Messages Targeted to African
American Women, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247 (1995); Beth E. Meyerowitz & Shelly
Chaiken, The Effect of Message Framing on Breast Self-Examination Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 500 (1987).
99. Bibas, supra note 98, at 2514.
100. Mathur et al., supra note 98, at 142.
101. Meyerowitz & Chaiken, supra note 98, at 500–10.
102. Kalichman & Coley, supra note 98 at 250–52.
103. Rothman et al., supra note 98, at 1355–69.
104. See Traci Mann et al., Dispositional Motivations and Message Framing: A Test
of the Congruency Hypothesis in College Students, 23 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 330 (2004).
105. Id. at 332.
106. Id. at 333.
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The framing hypothesis and prospect theory apply directly to
anti-surcharge laws.107 These laws are purposefully constructed so
customers are subject to a framed scenario in which they are exposed
to discounts rather than surcharges. When people are asked to pay a
surcharge, they view it as losing money from their pockets, whereas
when people are subjected to a discount, they view it as a gain of
money they were prepared to spend.108 Therefore, people are more
likely to purchase an item if the outcome is framed as a gain (a discount) rather than a loss (a surcharge).
For example, if a banana was $2 when paid for with cash and
$2.03 when paid for with a credit card, the price of the banana would
be $2 with a surcharge of three cents or the price would be $2.03 with
a discount of three cents. The outcomes are exactly the same; the only
difference is how the scenario is framed—and customers have less
cognitive resistance to receiving the discount than they do to paying
the surcharge. Anti-surcharge laws essentially take advantage of the
framing hypothesis and prospect theory to make customers more
likely to purchase products by avoiding psychological resistance to
surcharges and playing to their preference for discounts. Put differently, people are more likely to forgo using a credit card if it costs
them more (a negatively framed surcharge) than if not using it will
cost them less (a positively framed discount). This is undoubtedly why
credit card companies champion laws banning surcharges.
Although psychological factors are key to understanding the rationale underpinning anti-surcharge statutes, the determination of
whether they will rise or fall in the face of constitutional challenges is
based on larger considerations. These include the First Amendment
dichotomy between speech and conduct, the right to express oneself
and to receive speech from others, and how narrowly courts should
construe statutory language in order to save a statute from being struck
down. These considerations are addressed in Part II.
II.
EXPLORING KEY CONCEPTS AFFECTING THE ANTI-SURCHARGE
CASES: POINTS OF CONTENTION AND DISPUTE
This part provides a primer on three crucial legal considerations
affecting litigation of anti-surcharge statutes. The trio of topics explored here is then later applied in Parts III and IV.

107. See generally Kitch, supra note 93.
108. Id. at 218.
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Section A analyzes the dichotomy between speech and conduct.
This distinction is important because the Eleventh Circuit in Dana’s
Railroad Supply concluded that Florida’s statute raised fatal First
Amendment speech concerns,109 while the Second Circuit in Expressions Hair Design determined that New York’s law affected only conduct, rendering free speech claims nugatory.110
Section B examines the unenumerated First Amendment right to
receive speech. Recognition of this right is important because if antisurcharge statutes do, in fact, raise First Amendment issues, then two
sets of speech rights are at stake—the right of merchants to speak and
the right of consumers to receive speech.
Section C provides an overview on the issue of courts adopting or
rejecting saving constructions of statutes, in light of separation of
powers concerns between the judicial and legislative branches. This is
important because the dissent in Dana’s Railroad Supply accused the
majority of adopting a statute-killing construction of Florida’s antisurcharge law and argued that a saving construction was possible.111
A. The Implied First Amendment Right to Receive Speech
The First Amendment provides an explicit, unequivocal right to
speak,112 while the corollary right to receive speech is merely implicit.
Yet, as described in this section, legal scholars have long maintained
that the explicit right is hollow without its implicit counterpart. This
unenumerated right is relevant in the anti-surcharge cases because customers may argue that they have a right to receive information from
merchants about surcharges imposed by credit card companies.
As articulated by Professor Marc Blitz, a listener’s right to receive information “is simply the mirror image of the speaker’s right to
express it. And the First Amendment cannot protect one without
meaningfully protecting the other.”113 Without both a listener and a
speaker, the free speech guarantee is, in the words of First Amendment scholar and current Delaware Law School Dean Rodney Smolla,
“as empty as the sound of one hand clapping.”114 Although courts
109. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text (addressing Chief Judge Carnes’
dissent in Dana’s R.R. Supply).
112. See supra note 2 (setting forth the relevant portion of the text of the First
Amendment).
113. Marc J. Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied
Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799, 809 (2006).
114. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 198 (1992).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\20-1\NYL103.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 19

10-APR-17

SURCHARGES V. DISCOUNTS IN FREE SPEECH

15:59

167

historically focused on protecting speakers, the Supreme Court gradually extended protection to recipients.115
The Court first articulated the right to receive speech in the 1943
case of Martin v. City of Struthers,116 which struck down an ordinance
that outlawed knocking on doors of private homes to distribute religious literature.117 Writing for the majority, Justice Black found that
freedom of speech not only embraces the right to distribute literature,
but also “necessarily protects the right to receive it.”118
The right to receive speech was further articulated in a pair of
1965 rulings.119 In Lamont v. Postmaster General,120 the Court struck
down a law that allowed postal officials to refuse to deliver “communist political propaganda” mailed from overseas unless the addressee
specifically requested delivery in writing.121 Concurring, Justice Brennan directly linked the right to speak with the right to receive speech,
opining that “the dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if
otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them.
It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no
buyers.”122 Lamont was also noteworthy because the plaintiff was a
recipient of the material targeted by the law, rather than the sender.123
That same year, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 124 struck
down a state law that, among other things, made it a crime for physicians to provide information about contraception to married
couples.125 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas reasoned that
Connecticut could not “contract the spectrum of available knowledge”
for married couples and that receiving information was a “peripheral”
115. See Blitz, supra note 113, at 800 (explaining that a right to receive speech has
been well established by the courts); Philip J. Cooper, Rusty Pipes: The Rust Decision
and the Supreme Court’s Free Flow Theory of the First Amendment, 6 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 359, 360 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has moved
away from emphasizing speakers’ rights and towards emphasizing the free flow of
information); Thomas J. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 7 (1976) (noting that the Supreme Court “has normally recognized
the right of the recipients to seek direct vindication of their right to know”).
116. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 143.
119. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
120. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 301.
121. Id. at 302.
122. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 304 (majority opinion).
124. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
125. Id. at 481.
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right to the First Amendment without which “the specific rights would
be less secure.”126
These three cases—Martin, Lamont, and Griswold—all addressed speech that is clearly protected by the First Amendment, including political and religious messages and communication between
a doctor and a patient. However, the Court later extended the right to
receive speech into the less-protected commercial sphere in Virginia
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council.127 In that case, the
Court struck down a state law prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prices for prescription drugs.128 The Court held that recipients of
purely economic speech also have First Amendment protection.129 Interestingly, the successful plaintiffs were not pharmacists who wanted
to advertise, but consumers who objected to being unable to receive
drug advertisements.130 In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun
held that this distinction did not matter: “Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case
here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and
recipients both.”131
Two traditional First Amendment theories—democratic self-governance132 and the marketplace of ideas133—explain why the right to
receive speech deserves as much protection as the right to speak. Democracy requires collective decision-making, which in turn requires
citizens to receive the information they need to be well-informed.134 If
the value of free speech lies in promoting democratic order, then the
ability of listeners to receive messages and react to them is as important, if not more important, than the right of the speaker to expati-

126. Id. at 482–83.
127. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 763–70.
130. Id. at 748.
131. Id. at 756.
132. The democratic self-governance theory was first articulated by philosopher and
educator Alexander Meiklejohn, who posited that free speech provides the necessary
framework for democracy to function effectively. See generally ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
133. The marketplace of ideas theory, first articulated by philosopher John Stuart
Mill, posits that truth may ultimately emerge from the competition of ideas in free and
transparent public discourse. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859). This theory was initially applied to First
Amendment jurisprudence by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
134. Emerson, supra note 115, at 7.
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ate.135 Indeed, as Professor David Strauss notes, the democratic selfgovernance justification for free speech is inherently listener-based.136
In addition to its democratic function, the right to receive information allows people unfettered access to explore the marketplace of
ideas.137 In the marketplace, messages are paramount, as is the ability
to communicate; thus, transmissions between sender and receiver must
be shielded from government interference.138 Preserving the ability to
send and receive messages also ensures a robust stock of information
is available in the marketplace.139 And that stock is not limited to political speech. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court held that a
consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information “may
be as keen . . . [as] his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate”140—a conclusion directly applicable to the constitutional contretemps over no-surcharge statutes.
B. The Speech-Conduct Dichotomy in First Amendment Law
University of Iowa professor Randall Bezanson emphasizes in a
recent article that the First Amendment guarantee of free speech traditionally “has rested on two fundamental boundaries: speech versus
conduct and liberty versus utility.”141 The first of those boundaries—
the one separating speech from conduct—is pivotal in the antisurcharge cases. While the Eleventh Circuit in Dana’s Railroad Supply held “that Florida’s no-surcharge law triggers First Amendment
scrutiny as a restriction on speech,”142 the Second Circuit in Expressions Hair Design concluded that a remarkably similar New York
statute “does not regulate speech.”143
Given these disparate outcomes, a fundamental question arises:
how, in general, do courts distinguish speech from conduct? As a
threshold matter, the text of the First Amendment prohibits restrictions

135. David A. Strauss, Rights and the System of Freedom of Expression, 1993 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 202 (1993).
136. Id.
137. Blitz, supra note 113, at 803.
138. Cooper, supra note 115, at 365.
139. Id.
140. Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
141. Randall P. Bezanson, Is There Such a Thing as Too Much Free Speech?, 91 OR.
L. REV. 601, 601 (2012).
142. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Florida, 807 F.3d 1235, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en
banc denied, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016).
143. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
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on speech and makes no mention of conduct.144 Yet the Supreme
Court has “long . . . protected conduct that communicates under the
First Amendment.”145
In Spence v. Washington,146 the Court held in 1974 that conduct
rises to the level of speech when there is both “[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message”147 via the conduct and when, “in the surrounding circumstances, the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.”148 Under this two-part
test, burning the American flag as a form of symbolic protest outside a
political convention constitutes speech within the ambit of the First
Amendment.149 Even nude dancing “is expressive conduct within the
outer perimeters of the First Amendment,”150 at least when it occurs in
the context of a performance at a sexually oriented business.
As Justice O’Connor wrote in 2003, “the First Amendment protects symbolic conduct as well as pure speech.”151 The meaning of
“speech,” in turn, is expanding. A federal appellate court in 2013, for
example, held that the act of “liking” on Facebook constitutes both
pure speech and symbolic expression.152 More recently, in December
2015 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Buehrle v.
City of Key West 153 joined a growing number of courts in recognizing
that the act of “tattooing is protected artistic expression.”154 What is
key here is that it is not just the tattoo (the end product) that courts are
protecting, but also the tattooing process.155
144. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated
more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
145. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1117
(5th ed. 2015).
146. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
147. Id. at 410–11.
148. Id. at 411.
149. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1991).
150. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991).
151. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 n.2 (2003).
152. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013).
153. 813 F.3d 973 (11th Cir. 2015).
154. Id. at 975. In 2010, the Ninth Circuit recognized tattooing as a form of expression in Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010).
155. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1060 (“The tattoo itself, the process of tattooing, and
even the business of tattooing are not expressive conduct but purely expressive activity fully protected by the First Amendment.”).
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Yet “symbolic speech is an area that has continued to give courts
difficulty in interpretation and application.”156 Furthermore, the antisurcharge statutes do not remotely involve any type of “conduct” that
would fall under the traditional symbolic expression analysis of
Spence. For example, Dana’s Railroad Supply and Expressions Hair
Design are not akin to cases where a person burns a cross to express a
message of racial intimidation157 or where the very act of marching by
a particular group of individuals in a parade is expressive.158 The symbolic speech doctrine from Spence thus offers little guidance for analyzing the anti-surcharge statute cases, where merchants simply want
to use the spoken word—what is best characterized as “pure
speech”159—to describe to customers a fee imposed upon credit card
transactions.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in Sorrell v. IMS Health,
Inc. offers guidance that is more relevant to the anti-surcharge
cases.160 In Sorrell, the Court reasoned that “restrictions on protected
expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more
generally, on nonexpressive [sic] conduct. It is also true that the First
Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or
conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.”161
A key question in the Sorrell line of cases, as the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote in 2015, is whether the law at
issue constitutes “an economic regulation that does not target speech
or expressive conduct.”162 Similarly, Judge Kaplan of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York cited Sorrell in July 2015
to support the proposition that laws directed “at ‘commerce or conduct,’ fall outside the purview of the First Amendment even if they
impose ‘incidental burdens on speech.’”163 Therefore, “[t]he notion
that there is a distinction between laws that regulate speech and laws
156. David Mangone, Article, Speech at a Crossroads: The Intersection of Symbolic
Speech, Government Speech, and the State License Plate, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 97, 101
(2014).
157. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (“[T]he burning of a cross is
symbolic expression. The reason why the Klan burns a cross at its rallies, or individuals place a burning cross on someone else’s lawn, is that the burning cross represents
the message that the speaker wishes to communicate.”).
158. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
569–70 (1995).
159. See Eberle, supra note 37, at 1216 (noting that pure speech is “devoid of
conduct”).
160. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
161. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
162. Int’l Franchise Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 408 (9th Cir. 2015).
163. Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices, 118 F. Supp. 3d 554, 571
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567).
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that regulate conduct with merely an incidental effect on speech is
well established.”164
Under Sorrell and its progeny, the question becomes whether
anti-surcharge laws like those in Florida, New York, California, and
Texas are directed at economic conduct and have only an incidental
effect on free speech or whether they regulate expression in a more
significant way and trigger First Amendment scrutiny. To determine if
they do so, courts must engage in statutory construction. Section C
provides a brief primer on statutory and saving constructions.
C. Saving Statutory Constructions
“The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and
not to destroy.” 165

Those were the words of Chief Justice Hughes back in 1937.166
Nearly eighty years later, they remain vital because, as the Supreme
Court recently observed, “[t]he text of a statute can sometimes have
more than one possible meaning.”167 Today, the consensus among
judges has not changed from Hughes’ time regarding their role in statutory construction—judges should save statutes, if possible, before
declaring them unconstitutional.168
For example, Chief Justice Roberts wrote in 2012 that “it is well
established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which
violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does
not do so.”169 Similarly, as the late Justice Scalia wrote in 2009, “[t]he
so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool,
counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid
serious constitutional doubts.”170 Furthermore, the California Supreme
Court opined in 1995 that it even “is appropriate in some situations for
courts to reform—i.e., ‘rewrite’—enactments in order to avoid consti164. Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L.
REV. F. 183, 188 (2015).
165. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
166. Id.
167. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Brune, 767 F.3d 1009, 1023 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting
that “as between multiple reasonable interpretations of a statute, we will always prefer
one that sustains constitutionality to one that does not under the presumption of constitutional validity,” and quoting language from Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. to support this proposition). See generally Peter D. Webster et al., Statutory Construction in
Florida: In Search of a Principled Approach, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 435, 439–42
(2008) (setting forth the views of multiple judges who agree with this sentiment by
suggesting that judges should fill gaps in statutes where needed).
169. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593.
170. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009).
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tutional infirmity, when doing so ‘is more consistent with legislative
intent than the result that would attend outright invalidation.’”171 In
brief, then, there is much courts can do to provide a “saving construction”172 that rescues a statute from demise.
Balanced against the desire to save statutes, however, is judicial
fear of encroaching into legislative territory. The separation of powers
doctrine173 thus remains central in statutory construction debates. As
Florida Appellate Court Judge Webster writes, “when judges stray beyond the realm of construing statutes and into that of rewriting them,
they are exercising powers granted to the legislative branch of government and, thereby, violating the separation of powers doctrine.”174 A
further problem with statutory construction is that it is not always
clear which method of construction courts should use to determine if
saving a statute is possible.175
Questions of statutory and saving constructions are critical in
both Dana’s Railroad Supply and Expressions Hair Design. Specifically, the dissent in Dana’s Railroad Supply rebuked the Eleventh Circuit majority for rejecting the Florida “statute’s narrow definition of
the term ‘surcharge’ in favor of what it perceives to be the more colloquial meaning of the word,” stating it was “wrong to do so.”176 The
majority opinion of the Second Circuit in Expressions Hair Design
arguably employed the statutory construction facet of constitutional
avoidance177 to dodge First Amendment scrutiny of the statute and, in
turn, save it.178 This section thus provides a brief overview of statutory construction.
171. Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 905 P.2d 1248, 1270 (Cal. 1995)
(quoting Arp v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd., 563 P.2d 849, 856 (Cal. 1977)).
172. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 691 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) (“[W]here a saving construction of the statute’s language ‘is fairly possible,’ we must adopt it.”).
173. See Webster et al., supra note 168, at 494 (noting that separation of powers “is
generally understood as referring to a division of the principal functions of government among three coordinate branches—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial—no one of which is to be superior to the others”).
174. Id. at 498.
175. Id. at 488–90.
176. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Florida, 807 F.3d 1235, 1252 (11th Cir. 2015) (Carnes,
C.J., dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016).
177. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (emphasis added) (noting that
when the validity of a law “is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided”).
178. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 118 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
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Statutory construction, as the term suggests, involves courts construing statutes to determine their exact meaning.179 Typically, statutory construction issues arise in two scenarios: 1) when a statute’s
language is unclear as applied to the given facts; and 2) when a statute’s language may be clear, but the given factual scenario was not
envisioned when the statute was enacted.180 Ultimately, “when construing statutes, the courts’ obligation is to determine what the legislature ‘intended’ the statutes to mean.”181
At the broadest level, when the parsing of a statute renders multiple possible interpretations, courts should choose the one that saves it
from unconstitutionality—a saving construction.182 A narrowing construction is employed when a court finds a law unconstitutional, but
does so on narrow grounds so as to limit unforeseen effects on future
cases.183
Sometimes courts opt for narrowing constructions, specifically
when statutes are suspected of being unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.184 Instead of declaring such laws unconstitutional, courts may
limit their meaning to a scenario that is constitutional.185 Yet, this
power is not absolute. As the Supreme Court wrote in Reno v. ACLU,
it “may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is ‘readily
susceptible’ to such a construction.”186 The Court has found that susceptibility to such a construction exists when “the text or other source
of congressional intent identified a clear line that [the] Court could
draw.”187
When courts engage in statutory construction, they can employ
several different techniques. Justice Sotomayor, for instance, recently
wrote that “traditional tools of statutory construction” include a “statute’s text, structure, drafting history, and purpose.”188 Ultimately, as
Professor Wilson Huhn recently wrote, the text of the statute and a

179. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR. & JOHN M. SCHEB II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SOURCES OF POWER AND RESTRAINT 51 (4th ed. 2008).
180. Webster et al., supra note 168, at 498.
181. Jack L. Landau, The Intended Meaning of “Legislative Intent” and Its Implications for Statutory Construction in Oregon, 76 OR. L. REV. 47, 47 (1997).
182. STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 179, at 51–52.
183. Id. at 52.
184. Robert Batey, The Vagueness Doctrine in the Roberts Court: Constitutional
Orphan, 80 UMKC L. REV. 113, 128–29 (2011–12).
185. Id.
186. 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997).
187. Id.
188. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1456 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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search for legislative intent are “standard forms of statutory
construction.”189
The starting point—and sometimes end point—in statutory construction is the text of a statute,190 with courts searching for its plain
meaning. As Justice Thomas wrote for the majority in Carcieri v.
Salazar,191 “[t]his case requires us to apply settled principles of statutory construction under which we must first determine whether the
statutory text is plain and unambiguous. If it is, we must apply
the statute according to its terms.”192 Thus, as Chief Justice Roberts
recently wrote, “[i]f the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it
according to its terms.”193
This sounds simple, but the determination of “[w]hether a statutory term is unambiguous . . . does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component words.”194 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg recently
observed that consideration of the surrounding context in which an
ostensibly plain term is used is critical.195 As Justice Ginsburg artfully
noted, “[o]rdinarily, a word’s usage accords with its dictionary definition. In law as in life, however, the same words, placed in different
contexts, sometimes mean different things.”196 The key, as Justice
Thomas wrote for a unanimous Court in McNeill v. United States,197
is that “in all statutory construction cases, we begin with ‘the language
itself [and] the specific context in which that language is used.’”198 In
a nutshell, language plus context are the crucial building blocks of
statutory construction.
This comports with the canon of textualism famously championed by Justice Scalia.199 Textualists, as the name suggests, focus on
the text of the statute, but also keep in mind the specific context, mak189. Wilson Huhn, Realism Over Formalism and the Presumption of Constitutionality: Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion Upholding the Individual Mandate, 46 AKRON L.
REV. 117, 126 (2013).
190. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013) (“As in any statutory construction case, we start . . . with the statutory text, and proceed from the understanding that
unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with
their ordinary meaning.”).
191. 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
192. Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
193. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
194. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015).
195. Id. at 1081–82.
196. Id. at 1082.
197. 131 S. Ct. 2218 (2011).
198. Id. at 2221.
199. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO.
L.J. 341, 353 (2010).
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ing sure to construe the text not strictly but reasonably.200 In fact,
Justice Scalia wrote in 1997 that “[i]n textual interpretation, context is
everything.”201 This is dubbed “new textualism”, with Professor Robert Martineau writing that, while “a strict textualist considers only the
language of the statute, a new textualist examines not only the specific
statutory language which is the subject of litigation, but the entire statute as reflected by other legislation enacted by the same
legislature.”202
If ambiguity still exists after considering text and context, then
some jurists search for meaning via legislative history. As NYU Law
Professor Adam Samaha writes, “a statute’s plain meaning (somehow
ascertained) is said to trump any other consideration that might be
relevant to interpretation, such as the lessons of legislative history.
Consistent with a lexically inferior ranking, legislative history is not
available to create ambiguity in statutory text—only to resolve it.”203
Use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, however,
constitutes “one of the most intense jurisprudential debates in modern
American law,”204 and a complete discussion of this controversy is far
beyond the scope of this article. Perhaps Justice Stevens captured it
best when he wrote that if ambiguity persists after reviewing the text
and context of a statute and “[i]f you are desperate, or even if you just
believe it may shed some light on the issue, consult the legislative
history.”205
A fundamental limit on how far courts can go to save a statute
rests in the separation of powers doctrine. It holds that there is a division of key functions of government among the three branches—judicial, legislative, and executive—to ensure no one group retains all the
power.206 As is relevant here, the legislative branch has the power to
create laws, while the judiciary wields the power to interpret and void

200. Id.
201. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 37 (1997).
202. Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A
Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1993).
203. Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661, 1708
(2010).
204. Mark DeForrest, Taming a Dragon: Legislative History in Legal Analysis, 39
DAYTON L. REV. 37, 38 (2013).
205. John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1373, 1381 (1992).
206. See Webster et al., supra note 168, at 494.
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unconstitutional ones.207 In relation to statutory construction, Justice
Frankfurter advised:
[T]he function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of
words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power
which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature. The
great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the need
for discipline in observing the limitations. A judge must not rewrite
a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it.208

In summary, when engaging “in statutory construction, the Court
walks a fine line between restraint and activism.”209 Although there is
no clear answer on when judges go too far in trying to save a statute, it
is helpful to keep in mind the specific role of the judiciary. Additionally, because judges use multiple statutory construction canons, it is
difficult to determine where the line is between merely interpreting
statutes and changing their meaning.210 This fine line distinction is a
key issue in Dana’s Railroad Supply and Expressions Hair Design.
III.
SPEECH V. CONDUCT IN THE ANTI-SURCHARGE CASES:
EXPLORING HOW THE ELEVENTH AND SECOND
CIRCUITS REACHED CONTRASTING
CONCLUSIONS IN 2015
This part compares and contrasts the reasoning and the application of principles of statutory construction in Dana’s Railroad Supply
and Expressions Hair Design to decipher how the Eleventh and Second Circuits reached opposite conclusions regarding whether similar
anti-surcharge statutes address speech or conduct. Section A examines
Dana’s Railroad Supply, comparing the logic of the majority with the
reasoning of the dissent. Section B then analyzes the unanimous appellate court opinion in Expressions Hair Design.
Some fundamental principles of statutory construction addressed
above in Part II.C, along with the Supreme Court’s discussion in Sorrell of the dichotomy between speech and economic conduct covered
in Part II.A, play important roles in explaining the rift between the
majority and dissent in Dana’s Railroad Supply.
207. Id. at 495 (citing the Constitution’s articulation of the responsibilities of each
branch).
208. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 528 (1947).
209. RICHARD PACELLE, JR., THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH? 102 (2002).
210. Webster et al., supra note 168, at 498.
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A. Dana’s Railroad Supply v. Florida:
The Fractured Views of the Eleventh Circuit
This section separately examines, in subsections one and two, respectively, the majority and dissenting opinions in Dana’s Railroad
Supply.211 The statute at issue upon which they fractured provides
that:
A seller may not impose a surcharge on the buyer . . . for electing
to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar
means, if the seller . . . accepts payment by credit card. A surcharge
is any additional amount imposed at the time of a sale . . . by the
seller . . . that increases the charge to the buyer . . . for the privilege
of using a credit card to make payment. . . . This section does not
apply to the offering of a discount for the purpose of inducing payment by cash, check, or other means not involving the use of a
credit card, if the discount is offered to all prospective
customers.212

The statute was challenged by several Florida merchants who sought
to describe “to their customers the price difference as an additional
amount for credit-card use rather than a lesser amount for paying in
cash.”213 In other words, they sought to call it a surcharge. The
merchants argued in their March 2014 complaint “that Florida’s nosurcharge law violates the First Amendment as an unjustified restriction on speech.”214
1. The Majority: A Matter of First Amendment Protected Speech
Writing for the two-judge majority, Judge Tjoflat initially framed
the pivotal question by remarking that “[t]he fate of Florida’s nosurcharge law hinges on a single determination: whether the law regulates speech—triggering First Amendment scrutiny—or whether it
regulates conduct—subject only to rational-basis review as a mine-run
economic regulation.”215 Judge Tjoflat began his analysis by examining the text of the statute.
Judge Tjoflat’s initial step of examining the text comports
squarely with well-settled principles of statutory construction addressed earlier in this article.216 Furthermore, Judge Tjoflat acknowl211. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Florida, 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc
denied, 809 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016).
212. FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (2015).
213. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1239.
214. Id. at 1240.
215. Id. at 1241.
216. See supra Part II.C.
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edged the importance of what he called “saving interpretations,”217
writing that “before holding that a statute violates the Constitution we
therefore look to ‘reasonable’ alternative constructions.”218 Yet, perhaps foreshadowing the ultimate rejection of such a saving construction here, Judge Tjoflat cautioned that the court would not “contort,
disfigure, or vitiate a law’s plain meaning and readily discerned purpose merely for the sake of statutory preservation.”219
The majority ultimately concluded “that no saving effort, however valiant, can overcome the clear thrust of the statute’s plain meaning,”220 which was to target “expression alone”221 and to apply “only
to how a merchant may frame the price difference between cash and
credit-card payments.”222 In brief, they found that the statute “has the
sole effect of banning merchants from uttering the word
surcharge.”223 Although the majority acknowledged the statute
“clearly touches on economic activity,”224 the burden it imposed on
speech was more than the acceptable “incidental” variety permitted
under Sorrell for economic regulations.225 Indeed, Judge Tjoflat wrote
that the statute imposed “a direct and substantial burden on disfavored speech—by silencing it.”226
The majority reached this conclusion by adopting a dictionary
definition for the term discount,227 which was left undefined by Florida lawmakers; minimizing the importance of the clause “at the time
of a sale”228 in the statute’s definition of the term surcharge;229 and
employing a “glass half-full” analogy to drive home its conclusion
that the terms surcharge and discount were, practically speaking, identical in meaning.230
The two critical words at the heart of the Florida statute are
“surcharge” and “discount.” The statute defines the former, but fails to
do so for the latter. Thus, to understand “discount” and, in particular,
217. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1242.
218. Id. (quoting Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–94
(2012)).
219. Id. at 1242.
220. Id. at 1243.
221. Id. at 1245.
222. Id. at 1248.
223. Id. at 1251.
224. Id. at 1247.
225. Id. at 1248.
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 1243.
228. FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (2015).
229. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1244 n.7.
230. Id. at 1245.
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the phrase “a discount for the purpose of inducing payment by cash,”
the majority employed the “plain and ordinary meaning” rule—i.e. it
turned to a dictionary.231 This method assumes that lawmakers use
“words in a statute as they are commonly understood.”232 Citing the
Oxford English Dictionary, the court defined discount as a “deduction
(typically a certain percentage) made from a price or an amount
due.”233
The majority concluded that because the statute allows for discounts, it does not ban dual-pricing altogether and thus it surely must
do something else.234
The majority next turned its attention to the phrase “imposed at
the time of a sale,”235 which is part of the definition of “surcharge.”
Judge Tjoflat minimized the importance of “imposed at time of a
sale,” finding that adhering to its literal meaning would “narrow the
no-surcharge law into nothingness.”236 He observed that courts must
“avoid statutory constructions that render provisions meaningless.”237
The majority then speculated about the legislative intent behind
this language. If lawmakers included the phrase “imposed at time of a
sale” to prohibit ambush or bait-and-switch schemes,238 then as long
as merchants made customers aware of surcharges any time before
actual sales, they would comply with the law.239 They might do so, the
majority suggested, simply by hanging signs on cash registers telling
buyers a surcharge is imposed for credit card purchases, accompanied
by the statute’s text.240 But if that were the case, the majority reasoned, then the statute would prohibit almost no behavior, which
surely could not have been the legislature’s intent.241
Additionally, the majority proffered two other reasons why the
“imposed at the time of a sale” language does not save the statute.
First, the judges noted that Florida’s Attorney General “disavowed
such a narrow reading” in her own argument before the court.242 Sec231. Id. at 1243.
232. Id. (quoting Redus Fla. Commerical, LLC v. Coll. Station Retail Ctr., LLC, 777
F.3d 1187, 1191 (11th Cir. 2014)).
233. Id. at 1243 (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2015)).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1243–44.
236. Id. at 1244.
237. Id. at 1243 (quoting Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Updegraff, 147 F.3d 1344, 1351
(11th Cir. 1998)).
238. Id. at 1243–44.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1244 n.7.
242. Id. at 1254.
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ond, plaintiff Dana’s Railroad Supply did, in fact, post a sign informing customers of surcharges prior to purchase, yet it still received a
cease-and-desist letter for that very behavior.243 The majority reasoned that if the statute were read narrowly, the plaintiff would not
have received that letter.244 Finally, the majority found that Florida’s
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act already prohibits bait-andswitch conduct,245 so it was unlikely the legislature would have passed
another law as a “backstop to its unfair-competition law.”246
To further illustrate why the statute restricts speech, the majority
resorted to a hypothetical analogy:
Ostensibly worried about customers’ dining experiences being adversely affected by their unquenched thirst, a state makes it a crime
for restauranteurs to serve half-empty beverages. Restauranteurs
are, however, expressly allowed to serve half-full beverages. The
state has no greater regulatory scheme requiring restaurants to provide beverage refills, nor does it even require that beverages be
served at all. Would we say that what the state has done merely
regulates the economic affairs of the food-service industry? Of
course not.247

The majority argued that, under this reasoning, violating this
“glass-half-full mandate” depends “solely on the restauranteur’s
choice of words.”248 Because the words are what matter, the majority
wrote, the statute restricts speech and not conduct.249 Furthermore,
this restriction pertains to the content of speech because it determines
both what and how restauranteurs communicate to their customers.250
The majority saw no difference between this hypothetical situation—admittedly, a conceptual creation not backed by legal precedent—and Florida’s no-surcharge statute because both foist criminal
liability for saying something the wrong way.251 The Florida law thus
restricts speech based on content and therefore presumptively violates
the First Amendment.252 Indeed, the majority then struck it down as
an unconstitutional regulation of commercial speech.253
243. Id. at 1244.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1245.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 1249–51 (setting forth the majority’s analysis under the commercial
speech doctrine). A discussion of this analysis is beyond the scope of this article,
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2. The Dissent: A Matter of Economic Conduct
In a sharply worded dissent, Chief Judge Carnes accused the majority of ignoring the clear meaning of the Florida statute, particularly
the portion that defines a surcharge as “any additional amount imposed at the time of a sale,” while expressly allowing a discount.254 In
Carnes’ view, the legislature made a vital distinction between permissible discounts and forbidden surcharges based on when merchants
inform customers about the additional fees, rather than what
merchants say in characterizing them255: “Prescribing when a business
can add an additional amount to its price controls the timing of conduct and not the speech describing that conduct.”256
Chief Judge Carnes maintained that by adopting “a statute-killing
definition of ‘surcharge’”257 as merely “a negative discount,”258 rather
than following the statutory definition, the majority put “a great big
First Amendment bullseye”259 on Florida’s law:
Having redesigned the target so that the only distinction between a
“surcharge” and a “discount” is the speech labeling it, the majority
opinion has no trouble hitting what it aims at . . . . The majority
opinion treats the annoying inconvenience of the statutory definition of “surcharge” as nothing more than an “alternative construction,” which it disparages as a “strained reading” of the statute. It is
passing strange for a court to dismiss a legislature’s definition of its
own words as a strained reading of the legislature’s own words.260

In terms of principles of statutory construction, Chief Judge
Carnes criticized the majority for applying the “colloquial meaning”261 of “surcharge” rather than the one defined by the legislature.
He asserted that “[w]e are to use the ‘common and ordinary meaning’
of a statutory term only if there is no ‘statutory or regulatory definition’ of it.”262 Chief Judge Carnes stressed that “the legislature has the
right to define the terms it uses, which is why the statutory definition
of a statutory term controls statutory construction of the term.”263
which instead focuses on the threshold and foundational issue of whether antisurcharge laws even involve speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.
254. Id. at 1251 (Carnes, C.J., dissenting).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1257.
257. Id. at 1251.
258. Id. at 1245.
259. Id. at 1252.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 1187,
1193 (11th Cir. 2010)).
263. Id.
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In Chief Judge Carnes’ view, the majority’s assertion that the
statute unconstitutionally restricts speech only makes sense if it bans
all surcharges.264 However, the Chief Judge maintained that because
the law only precludes surcharges imposed “at the time of sale,” it is
not designed to be a restriction on speech.265 He also chided the majority for placing the Eleventh Circuit in conflict with the Second Circuit, which had previously upheld New York’s anti-surcharge law in
Expressions Hair Design.266
The bottom line from the Eleventh Circuit’s November 2015 ruling in Dana’s Railroad Supply is that the majority and dissent vehemently disagreed in applying principles of statutory construction. The
majority applied a dictionary definition of discount and, in Chief
Judge Carnes’ view, a similarly colloquial, but misguided, definition
of surcharge by essentially rendering nugatory the phrase “imposed at
the time of a sale.” Conversely, the dissent placed critical emphasis on
this phrase and, in doing so, embraced the constitutional avoidance
canon, under which “a federal court must construe a state statute to
avoid a constitutional problem if the statute is ‘susceptible of [such] a
construction.’”267
B. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman:
The Second Circuit View
The challenge to New York’s no-surcharge statute was first considered by Judge Rakoff, who struck the law down in October
2013.268 The statute provides that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction
may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in
lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.”269 The parties stipulated, in turn, that this language “does not bar sellers from offering
an equivalent ‘discount’ to consumers who use cash.”270
Judge Rakoff concluded that the statute, which stemmed from a
decades-long battle between credit card companies and consumer advocates,271 “clearly regulates speech, not conduct, and does so by ban264. Id. at 1254 n.2.
265. Id. at 1254.
266. Id. at 1257.
267. Id. at 1253 (quoting S. Utah Mines & Smelters v. Beaver Cty., 262 U.S. 325,
331 (1923)).
268. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), vacated, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
269. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (Consol. 2015).
270. Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
271. Id. at 438.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\20-1\NYL103.txt

184

unknown

Seq: 36

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

10-APR-17

15:59

[Vol. 20:149

ning disfavored expression.”272 The statute, he reasoned, “draws the
line between prohibited ‘surcharges’ and permissible ‘discounts’
based on words and labels, rather than economic realities,”273 making
distinctions in how vendors can communicate with their customers
“virtually incomprehensible.”274 He emphasized that “the manner in
which price information is conveyed to buyers is quintessentially expressive, and therefore protected by the First Amendment,”275 and
struck down the statute for failing to pass muster under the commercial speech doctrine.276
A three-judge panel of the Second Circuit, however, unanimously
disagreed, finding that the no-surcharge statute “regulates conduct, not
speech.”277 Writing for the appellate court, Judge Livingston held that
the statute “does not regulate speech as applied to single-sticker-price
sellers,” thus eliminating the need to even reach a commercial speech
analysis under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York.278 Furthermore, the court concluded that
the statute is readily susceptible to a narrowing construction since it
does not apply beyond the single-sticker-price context to reach dualprice scenarios, thereby avoiding any constitutional, i.e. First Amendment, issues that would be raised in such situations.279 The former
conclusion, as described below, is grounded on the speech-conduct
dichotomy, while the latter statutory construction fully embraces the
constitutional avoidance doctrine.
The court began by emphasizing that “prices, although necessarily communicated through language, do not rank as ‘speech’ within
the meaning of the First Amendment.”280 The court cited price-control
laws, in which sellers are banned from communicating certain prices
in order to protect consumers.281 Thus, although price advertising is
an activity protected by the First Amendment, the display of prices is
proscribed via economic regulations.282 As Judge Livingston wrote,
272. Id. at 444.
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 436.
275. Id. at 445.
276. See id. at 445–47.
277. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 135 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
278. Id. at 130 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
279. Id. at 137–40.
280. Id. at 130.
281. Id. at 130–31.
282. Id.
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“sticker prices, like any other prices, can be regulated without bringing the First Amendment into play.”283
Because the New York statute fails to define “surcharge,” the
Second Circuit engaged in the “plain and ordinary meaning” facet of
statutory construction,284 adopting a dictionary definition of surcharge
as “a charge in excess of the usual or normal amount.”285 Using that
definition, the judges ruled that the New York statute, unlike Florida’s
law, bans the imposition of any credit-card surcharge, no matter how it
is worded to the customer.286 Thus, the law merely prevents what sellers can do, not what they can say.287 The display of prices is a matter
of economic regulation, not expression.288
Put differently, the law does not ban merchants “from referring to
credit-cash price differentials as credit-card surcharges,” it simply forbids merchants from the act or conduct of “imposing credit-card
surcharges.”289 Colloquially put, the statute’s admonition is simply
this: “call it what you whatever you want, but just don’t do it.”
The Second Circuit also dismissed the plaintiffs’ policy-based argument that customers may react more negatively to surcharges than
to discounts. Judge Livingston reasoned that consumers’ reactions,
which flow from the act of the surcharge itself,290 are irrelevant, and a
negative reaction from consumers does not automatically mean
surcharges qualify as speech.291 As Judge Livingston noted, “[w]e are
aware of no authority suggesting that the First Amendment prevents
states from protecting consumers against irrational psychological annoyances.”292 Cynically put, it is simply “too bad, so sad” for consumers who are duped by their own psychological biases.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Expressions Hair Design is directly at odds with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Dana’s Railroad Supply regarding whether anti-surcharge laws involve speech
283. Id. at 134.
284. See supra notes 191–203 and accompanying text (discussing the plain meaning
rule).
285. Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 127.
286. See id. at 131 (opining that the statute, “by its terms . . . does not prohibit sellers
from referring to credit-cash price differentials as credit-card surcharges, or from engaging in advocacy related to credit-card surcharges; it simply prohibits imposing
credit-card surcharges”).
287. See id. (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 60 (2006)).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 132–33.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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and the First Amendment. With the creation of this appellate-level
split of authority, the constitutionality of anti-surcharge laws was ripe
for Supreme Court consideration, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Expressions Hair Design in September 2016.293
The article concludes by arguing that the unenumerated right of
consumers to receive information, which was not fully examined in
either case, provides the critical tipping point that militates in favor of
holding that anti-surcharge laws directly affect expression and thereby
raise First Amendment concerns.
IV.
CONCLUSION
A discussion of the constitutional implications of anti-surcharge
statutes reveals the long-standing dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence between speech and conduct,294 and questions the extent
to which courts should go to save a statute from unconstitutionality
when its intended meaning is ambiguous.295
Resolving the constitutionality of anti-surcharge statutes is critical, as nine states have adopted such measures.296 Furthermore, the
split of authority on this issue between the Second and Fifth Circuits
in Expressions Hair Design and Rowell, respectively, and the Eleventh Circuit in Dana’s Railroad Supply 297 leaves in its wake a tepid
mush of jurisprudential porridge, which the Supreme Court now has a
chance to clarify after granting a petition for a writ of certiorari in
Expressions Hair Design in September 2016.
The Eleventh Circuit held that a surcharge and a discount were,
essentially, two sides of the same coin. Thus, allowing merchants to
call a reduction in price a discount, but prohibiting them from adding a
fee and calling it a surcharge, unconstitutionally burdens merchants’
ability to communicate with their customers.298 Despite a biting dissent urging it to do so,299 the majority declined to adopt a saving construction that would have protected the handiwork of Florida
lawmakers from constitutional attack.300
293. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
294. See supra Part II.B (analyzing the dichotomy between speech and conduct).
295. See supra Part II.C (analyzing the concept of saving statutory construction).
296. See supra note 30 (identifying the nine states).
297. See supra Part III (analyzing the split of authority between the Eleventh and
Second Circuits); see supra note 34 and infra notes 303–05 (discussing Rowell).
298. See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 254–67 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 220–26 and accompanying text.
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A Second Circuit panel, however, unanimously ruled that a similar ban on surcharges in New York merely restricted what merchants
could do, not what they could say, and therefore was not an unconstitutional restriction on speech.301 Federal district courts within both the
Fifth Circuit also weighed in with discordant rulings in 2015,302 making this nationwide muddle murkier.
The Fifth Circuit split two-to-one in March 2016 in upholding
Texas’ anti-surcharge ban in Rowell v. Pettijohn 303 as a mere economic—rather than speech—regulation. Writing for the Fifth Circuit
majority, Judge Hawkins Barksdale reasoned, in accord with the Second Circuit in Expressions Hair Design, that “simply speaking about
the prices regulated by Texas’ law does not transform it into a contentbased speech restriction; the speech is merely incidental to the regulated economic conduct.”304 In contrast, Judge Dennis issued a dissent, finding, in agreement with the Eleventh Circuit in Dana’s
Railroad Supply, that “the Texas Anti-Surcharge Law makes the legality of a price differential turn on the language used to describe it.
This is not a regulation of pricing or of other economic activity, but
regulation of protected commercial speech.”305
Because surcharges and discounts operate in nearly identical
fashion, this article contends that the Eleventh Circuit’s speech-based
reasoning is more compelling than either the Second or Fifth Circuit’s
focus on conduct. Critically, two other factors also weigh in favor of
finding anti-surcharge statutes unconstitutional—namely, the detrimental psychological effect on consumers and the unenumerated First
Amendment right of those consumers to receive speech.
Both courts gave short shrift to the psychological impact. As outlined in Part II.B, consumers are likely to react against a negatively
framed surcharge but to accept a positively framed discount—even if
the net result is the same. Thus, by banning merchants from imposing
surcharges while allowing them to offer discounts, lawmakers tilt the
playing field in favor of the biggest and, arguably, only beneficiary of
these laws—credit card companies. The Second Circuit blithely dismissed such considerations as mere “irrational psychological annoyances,”306 but clearly real, live consumers are not dissuaded from

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See supra notes 268–93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73 (5th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 82.
Id. at 86 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
See supra note 292.
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ringing up more charges than they might otherwise be if they were
made aware of swipe fees, a fact that merits judicial consideration.
If the psychological implications were given short shrift, the right
of consumers to receive speech was given none at all.307 Neither the
Second or Eleventh Circuit considered whether the First Amendment
prevents states from depriving consumers of relevant information
about the true costs of using credit cards. This is a significant oversight, because there are two parties directly involved in every commercial transaction. Retail transactions involve merchants and
consumers. Conversations, in turn, involve speakers and listeners. Expressions Hair Design and Dana’s Railroad Supply meld both kinds
of relationships, involving merchants as otherwise willing speakers
and consumers as otherwise willing listeners. Unfortunately, the
merchants are not allowed to speak as they wish and the consumers, in
turn, are prohibited from receiving important information from
merchants. The right to receive speech thus is hindered by antisurcharge laws.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s holding in Virginia Pharmacy
Board v. Virginia Consumer Council—that a state could not prevent
pharmacists from advertising prices for prescription drugs—is both
relevant and analogous to the contretemps over anti-surcharge statutes.308 Surely, if a state cannot regulate information about prescription drugs, carrying the potential of life or death, it cannot control
information about the purchase of a model choo-choo train (Dana’s
Railroad Supply) or a hair weave (Expressions Hair Design). In other
words, it would seem far more important and justifiable for the government to regulate speech affecting one’s life and health than to regulate speech affecting the purchase of all other goods and services, yet
the Court rejected this in Virginia Pharmacy.309
Finally, it is worth considering whether the purported purpose of
anti-surcharge statutes—to protect consumers from being ambushed at
the cash register—can be fulfilled in some way short of banning
surcharges. For instance, both Florida and New York already provide
such protection with statutes outlawing bait-and-switch tactics.310 The
307. See supra Part II.B (analyzing the right to receive speech).
308. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text (analyzing Va. Pharm. Bd. v.
Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
309. See Va. Pharm. Bd., 425 U.S. at 770–71.
310. See FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201–501.213; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396 (Consol.
2015). For example, the applicable text of the New York statute reads as follows:
No person, firm, partnership, association or corporation, or agent or employee thereof, shall, in any manner, or by any means of advertisement,
or other means of communication, offer for sale any merchandise, com-

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\20-1\NYL103.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 41

10-APR-17

SURCHARGES V. DISCOUNTS IN FREE SPEECH

15:59

189

federal law that authorized credit card surcharges also requires
merchants to disclose them in advance.311 Thus, consumers are already adequately protected, making anti-surcharge statutes superfluous and the protection argument an artful mirage. Instead, this
misguided outbreak of government paternalism prevents merchants
from passing along to their customers the fees they are forced to pay
to credit card companies, and keeps them from educating customers
about those fees.
It is no doubt true that a consumer, if confronted with a credit
card surcharge, might very well decide to pay with cash instead. But
that disadvantages only the credit card company, neither the consumer
nor the merchant. So why should state power be brought to bear on
behalf of these companies, particularly when the First Amendment implications are so readily apparent? Why, indeed.
The Supreme Court has now stepped into the breach in Expressions Hair Design to decide whether anti-surcharge prohibitions pass
constitutional muster.312 In doing so, it should consider not only the
speech-versus-conduct dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence,
but also the right of credit card users to receive information and the
psychological constructs inherent in anti-surcharge laws that disadvantage consumers. A careful consideration of these factors will render
these statutes unconstitutional and will ultimately liberate consumers
now trapped in a vortex of government-enforced ignorance.

modity, or service, as part of a plan or scheme with the intent, design, or
purpose not to sell the merchandise, commodity, or service so advertised
at the price stated therein, or with the intent, design or purpose not to sell
the merchandise, commodity, or service so advertised. Nothing in this
section shall apply to any television or sound radio broadcasting station
or to any publisher or printer of a newspaper, magazine, or other form of
printed advertising, who broadcasts, publishes, or prints such
advertisement.
311. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
312. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). During oral argument in January 2017, several justices,
including Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor, reportedly seemed skeptical that New
York’s statute restricted speech. Robert Barnes, Court Weighs Credit Card ‘Swipe
Fees,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2017, at A3. The Supreme Court had not issued a ruling
in the case when this article went to press.
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